Abstract: The Monterrey Consensus agreed at the UN summit on Financing for Development in 2002 promised a breakthrough in terms of donor generosity, aid effectiveness and new means of financing. However, the development orientation of world leaders proved to be short-lived. This is even though our evaluation reveals progress since Monterrey in some areas, notably debt relief and private (FDI) flows. Calls for substantially scaling up regular aid had little effect, and financial innovations contributed only marginally to overall development financing so far. There is not much progress either from the perspective of critics focusing on the quality of aid. In particular, we find that the targeting of aid according to need and merit leaves much to be desired. The gap between words and deeds continues to be wide with regard to aid proliferation and donor coordination, too.
1.

Introduction
According to the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002 was "a turning point in the quest for economic and social progress. … It produced a breakthrough on the question of official development assistance, with substantial new pledges, and a major change in attitude."
1 The conference was the first UN summit-level meeting, attended by more than 50
Heads of State and Government, to address key financial issues pertaining to global development. While important elements of the Monterrey Consensus had been worked out over the previous four years, the summit convened just six months after the terrorist attacks of September 11 th , 2001 . As stressed by the Heads of State and Government, "it has now become all the more urgent to enhance collaboration among all stakeholders to … address the longterm challenges of financing for development."
Indeed, major initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, an innovative performance-based aid scheme announced by the Bush administration, arose out of the UN summit in Monterrey (Fleck and Kilby 2010) . 2 Likewise, European donors promised considerable increases in their aid budgets. All the same, sceptics such as Woods (2005) The Monterrey Consensus as well as the Doha Declaration addresses six major areas (so-called leading actions), ranging from the mobilization of domestic financial resources to systemic issues such as the coherence of the international monetary, financial and trading systems. The subsequent evaluation of the progress achieved since Monterrey focuses on foreign financing for development and leaves systemic issues out of account. In other words, we concentrate on transfers of capital from advanced (donor) countries to less advanced (recipient) countries. Specifically, we assess whether advanced countries became more generous in granting official development assistance (ODA) (Section 3), alleviated the debt situation of heavily indebted poor countries (Section 4), supported the integration of recipient countries into the international division of labour by providing "aid for trade" (Section 5), introduced financial innovations to mobilize additional resources for development (Section 6), improved the effectiveness of ODA by less aid fragmentation and more donor coordination (Section 7), and channelled private flows, notably foreign direct investment (FDI) , to an increasing number of developing economies (Section 8). However, the quality of local governance is widely perceived to be critical for sustainable development, irrespective of the source of (foreign or domestic) financing. Fighting corruption figures prominently in the Monterrey Consensus, too, as is evident from the short excerpt at the beginning of Section 2.
We start with this overarching issue before turning to specific aspects of foreign financing for development.
Fighting corruption
Good governance is essential for sustainable development. … Fighting corruption at all levels is a priority. Corruption is a serious barrier to effective resource mobilization and allocation, and diverts resources away from activities that are vital for poverty eradication
and economic and sustainable development (page 7, paragraphs 11 and 13).
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The former World Bank President James Wolfensohn highlighted corruption as a major impediment to effective aid and economic development in 1996 already: "Let's not mince words: we need to deal with the cancer of corruption". 6 Nevertheless, little has changed (see also Easterly 2007 countries, including by containing corruption. As noted by Alesina and Weder (2002: 1126) , "the rhetoric that accompanies these [aid] programs is that they serve not only of reducing poverty, but also of rewarding good policies and efficient and honest governments."
In striking contrast to the donors' rhetoric, the empirical findings of Alesina and Weder (2002) pointed to a vicious circle of donors granting aid indiscriminately to inefficient and dishonest governments and continuous aid inflows breeding further corruption. For the largest bilateral donor, the United States, aid was even shown to be positively correlated with corruption in recipient countries during the 1975-1995 period covered by Alesina and Weder.
The German government responded to a parliamentary inquiry in 1997 that "no development cooperation contracts were annulled due to proof of corruption" (as quoted by Cremer 2008: 122) .
Assessing the correlation between corruption and aid with more recent data suggests that donors have hardly become more selective by redirecting aid to better governed recipient countries and, thereby, improving the chances for an effective use of aid. 9 In Figure 1 , we show this correlation for the three-year period preceding the Monterrey Summit (1999) (2000) (2001) and the most recent three-year period for which complete aid data are available from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System (2007 System ( -2009 Figure 1 , the coefficient of control of corruption appears to be weakly positive in panel (b) . All the same, there is no significant evidence that DAC countries preferred recipients with better control of corruption in the most recent past.
9 See also recent empirical analyses of aid allocation (e.g. Dreher et al. 2010; Hoeffler and Outram 2011) . Schudel (2008) finds that corruption levels in the donor countries determine their reaction to corruption in the recipient countries. According to Claessens et al. (2009) Donor reliability and aid predictability are questionable not only with regard to specific aid schemes such as the MCC. The same applies to the international goal for industrialized countries to devote a specific proportion of their income to development assistance, which is almost as old as modern development cooperation itself. The 0.7 percent figure was first mentioned in the report of the Pearson Commission, which states that "we therefore recommend that each aid-giver increase commitments of official development assistance for net disbursements to reach 0.70 percent of its gross national product by 1975 or shortly thereafter, but in no case later than 1980" (Pearson et al. 1969: 148-149) . 12 It was loosely based on back-of-the-envelope calculations using the two-gap approach (e.g. Chenery and Strout 1966) , which in the tradition of the Harrod-Domar growth model assumes a fixed relationship between capital use and economic growth. Accordingly, any gap between domestic savings and overall capital needed to achieve a desired growth rate was to be filled by foreign aid.
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Despite the fact that there was almost no progress towards attaining it in the decades following its inception, the 0.7 percent aid target has remained on the political agenda doubts as to whether more aid translates into higher growth, but there are also some more favourable assessments (e.g. Dalgaard et al. 2004) , preventing any firm conclusion on the aidgrowth relationship.
12 See Clemens et al. (2007) for a detailed account of the developments that led to the formulation of the 0.7 percent goal. 13 The two-gap approach has been criticized for its unrealistic assumptions (e.g. Easterly 1999), but is nonetheless widely used as a tool for identifying external financing gaps (e.g. Devarajan et al. 2002) . 14 Average EU aid has been projected to rise to 0.48 percent in 2010 (OECD 2010).
Debt relief
External debt As indicated before, the cancellation of ODA-related debt must not be confused with longer- lending to African countries that had been granted debt relief before. They find "very little evidence" of free-riding by emerging lenders such as China and of imprudent lending to beneficiaries of debt relief. The latter finding is in contrast to an earlier evaluation of the HIPC initiative by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank. The IEG evaluation summarizes: "In 11 of 13 post-completion point countries for which data are available, the key indicator of external debt sustainability has deteriorated since completion point. In eight of these countries, the ratios have come to once again exceed HIPC thresholds." 17 Even though the empirical evidence continues to be ambiguous, it is probably safe to conclude that debt reduction granted ad-hoc is not sufficient to ensure debt sustainability. Orderly debt resolution mechanisms should thus remain on the international agenda to meet the Monterrey Consensus' call for "clear principles for the management and resolution of financial crises that provide for fair burden-sharing" (United Nations 2003: 17).
Aid for trade
We 18 It has to be noted that the lingering Doha Round of trade negotiations imposes severe limits on the possible contribution the aid-for-trade agenda can make. 19 The previous concept of "Trade-Related Assistance" had a much narrower focus on issues directly related to trade (e.g. Voionmaa and Brüntrup 2009) . 20 For a description of the components that make up these five aid categories and a discussion of how each of them might help raise the benefits from trade, see Higgins and Prowse (2010) resources. By contrast, the US Dollar value of more specifically trade-related measures in the category "trade policy and regulations" remained roughly constant over time, and these measures accounted for less than five percent of total aid for trade throughout. This is even though they have been shown to lower trading costs substantially (Cali and te Velde 2011) . 
Introducing innovative instruments
We According to Girishankar (2009: 14) , the financing of the Adaptation Fund is "a precedentsetting international 'tax' with a global base arising from an international treaty." The World 
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The proponents of raising development funds through international taxation stress the 'double dividend' that instruments such as the FTT and carbon taxes could yield. In addition to their large fundraising potential, international taxes could also have positive steering effects, notably by reducing financial instability and containing global warming (e.g., VENRO 2008) . 30 All the same, it typically involves trade-offs if one (tax) instrument shall achieve two objectives. On the one hand, critics of the FTT maintain that even low tax rates may impair the functioning of international capital markets. The FTT discourages not only destabilizing speculation but also short-term hedging against risk; by reducing the liquidity of money markets the FTT may even amplify price disturbances and market volatility (Grahl and Lysandrou 2003) . 31 On the other hand, the tax rates required for effectively steering economic activities may be considerably higher than the low rates currently discussed with respect to fundraising: "The taxes are not, therefore, guaranteed to have the major behavioural impact, discouraging pollution and speculation, which has been sought" (Atkinson 2005: 242) .
Focusing on fundraising and leaving steering functions to specific instruments, the introduction of new taxes may be inferior to raising the rate of an existing tax. 32 For instance, it tends to be more cost effective to mobilize additional MDG-related financing through higher rates of income and value-added taxes, compared to a new special tax. For the latter to generate the same net revenue, the gross tax burden tends to be higher because of additional costs of tax administration (Atkinson 2005: 24) . The frequently made assumption that new innovative instruments, including international taxes, will mobilize additional development funds is also open to debate. Scepticism is warranted particularly at times when the need for fiscal consolidation is pressing. Global programs such as the IFFIm that rely on ODA funding at least partly may lead donors to reduce bilateral aid projects in the health sector (Girishankar 2009 ). More generally, new sources of development finance may crowd out traditional forms of ODA so that the net effect is hard to predict.
29 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20110308IPR15028/html/MEPs-call-for-theintroduction-of-a-tax-on-financial-transactions (accessed: . This sum considerably exceeds previous estimates. However, the tax rate underlying the resolution is not specified in the press release. 30 For a more detailed discussion, see Atkinson (2005) . 31 For a similar line of reasoning, see Reisen (2002) . However, the majority view after the recent financial crisis appears to be that "financial markets are characterized by excessive liquidity" (Schulmeister 2009: 7) . 32 Reisen (2004: 27) concludes from his review of innovative approaches to funding the MDGs: "The most straightforward way to avoid underfunding of the Goals is to raise ODA." (Acharya et al. 2006) . At the same time, donors are often "poaching" qualified local labour. The theoretical case for donor coordination rests on the public good character of poverty alleviation in aid recipient countries (Torsvik 2005) . Assuming altruistic donors, the common goods problem would still imply an under-provision of aid unless donors cooperated and took into account that an extra amount of aid not only affects the welfare of the particular donor but also the welfare of all other donors.
Coordinating development cooperation
We follow Aldasoro et al. (2010) and adopt a two-step approach of assessing whether donors have improved aid effectiveness by increasing specialization and coordination. In the first step, we employ Theil indices to evaluate whether major donors, viewed as independent actors, have reduced aid proliferation and fragmentation by concentrating in selected recipient countries and specializing in selected aid sectors, for example aid for education. The Theil index (FrTh) is calculated as:
with aid i,s representing the share of aid in sector s to recipient i in donor country j's overall aid budget at time t. The index takes the minimum value ln(1) = 0 if donor j is completely specialized (all aid goes to sector s in country i); it rises with the extent of dispersion and reaches its maximum ln(n*m) when aid is evenly distributed among countries and sectors.
In the second step, we refer to the earlier literature on the measurement of intraindustry trade (Grubel and Lloyd 1971) . So-called trade overlaps have often been used to assess the empirical relevance of intra-industry trade. Analogously, we employ overlap indices to analyze to which extent donors coordinate their aid efforts. Combining the two dimensions of recipient countries and aid sectors, the index of aid overlap (I) or, respectively, the degree of donor coordination (C) between donors j1 and j2 at time t can be calculated as follows: Even less favourable conclusions than for the Theil indices emerge from the analysis of aid overlaps. In stark contrast to the provisions of the Monterrey Consensus, our calculations point to a falling degree of coordination for all major donors (Figure 6 ). 35 The change is particularly pronounced among donors with low initial overlap indices (Denmark, 34 Note that our analysis does not include non-DAC donors such as Brazil, China and India. The emergence of these new donors could further complicate the problem of aid fragmentation (Paolo and Reisen 2010) . 35 As shown by Aldasoro et al (2010) , the level of the overlaps mainly depends on the degree to which the underlying aid data are disaggregated. Using sector-specific aid to individual recipient countries, the overlaps rarely exceed 0.5 even if the distribution of aid by one particular donor is compared at different points in time.
France, and Japan). These three bilateral donors and IDA retain their leading position with regard to coordinated aid allocation in the period 2006-2009, but the distinction between better and worse performers gets increasingly blurred among bilateral donors. countries. 37 The Monterrey Consensus explicitly refers to the least developed countries, small island states as well as landlocked developing countries as those groups most in need of FDI to achieve national development priorities. Table 1 shows that the shares of these groups in worldwide FDI stocks continue to be extremely low. The same applies to the group of highly indebted poor countries. All low-income countries hosted just slightly more than three percent of worldwide FDI stocks in 2009 once China is excluded.
Attracting FDI
Furthermore, the challenge to promote economic growth and alleviate poverty by drawing on FDI extends far beyond the call from Monterrey to attract FDI flows to a larger number of countries. It appears to be particularly difficult to derive macroeconomic benefits from FDI where such benefits would be needed most. Local firms in poor countries are often too far behind the technological frontier to absorb superior technologies transferred by foreign investors (Aghion et al. 2005) . According to Borensztein et al. (1998) , FDI-related technology transfers translate into higher growth only when the host country is equipped with sufficiently qualified human capital. Alfaro et al. (2004) find that local financial markets need to be well 
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This may explain why UNCTAD argues that host countries "should perhaps pay more attention to the quality of FDI they receive, and take steps to enhance the developmental impact of FDI." 39 Indeed, Alfaro and Charlton (2007) find that the growth effects strengthen when accounting for the quality of FDI. This study relies on the subjective preferences of the host countries, as revealed by industry-level targeting by investment promotion agencies, to identify the quality of FDI. However, the findings of Alfaro and Charlton (2007) do not imply 37 For details see: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/. 38 For a similar conclusion, see Nunnenkamp (2004) . The poverty-alleviating effects of FDI may also be limited because FDI benefits more skilled workers in developing countries, and worsens the relative income position of then poor; for an overview of the relevant literature, see ODI (2002) . 39 The quote is from an earlier assessment of the performance and potential of FDI in Africa; for details see: http://www.fdi.net/unctad/5given.htm (accessed: March 2011); see also VENRO (2008: 5) . Pradhan (2006) proposes a composite index according to which the quality of FDI increases with the export orientation of foreign investors, R&D intensity, the localization of production (i.e., value added created in the host country), the demand for local inputs, and the extent to which (greenfield) engagements add to productive capacity.
that the developmental impact of FDI could be enhanced if only policymakers in less advanced host countries pursued selective FDI policies and provided targeted incentives.
Attempts at picking high-quality FDI may involve considerable costs in terms of effective screening and targeted incentives. The poorer the potential host country, the more likely it is that selective FDI policies suffer from lacking administrative capabilities. 40 Furthermore, previous experience with selective approval procedures and foreign ownership restrictions points to a serious trade-off: For instance, India's strict regulations until the early 1990s ensured that still realized FDI projects corresponded to the host country's preferences; however, they substantially reduced the number of realized projects -including those with the preferred high-quality characteristics (Görg et al. 2010) . In other words, the overall objective of the Monterrey Consensus to spread the benefits of FDI more widely could hardly be achieved more easily if policymakers in developing host countries targeted high-quality FDI.
Summary
Only six months after the terrorist attacks of September 2010, more than 50 Heads of State The sceptics were essentially proven right in suspecting that the development orientation of world leaders would turn out to be short-lived and soon be dominated by strategic motives in the ongoing War on Terror and economic self-interest once the United
States and Europe were threatened by the financial crisis. This is even though some progress has been made since Monterrey with respect to specific aspects of financing for development, notably debt relief and FDI flows. However, debt relief under the HIPC initiative dated further back into the late 1990s, and was clearly politically motivated in quantitatively important cases such as Iraq. By contrast, the boom in FDI flows was market driven which also explains why various poor countries continue to be sidelined. Specific initiatives such as aid for trade can help integrate more developing countries into the global division of labour; but better targeting would be required in order to support the neediest recipients, rather than those with relatively well established trade links with donor countries.
Critics have little to celebrate after Monterrey, no matter which of the two major camps they belong to. Those pinning their hope mainly on substantially increased amounts of aid in order to promote growth and alleviate poverty are concerned about broken promises and insufficient scaling up. The chances appear to be remote that the situation will improve and major donors will become more generous in the near future. The United States, Europe and Japan all confront huge fiscal consolidation needs in the aftermath of bank failures, sovereign debt crises and natural disasters. Innovative financial instruments have contributed little so far to ease the budgetary constraints of official donors. This is unlikely to change unless revived initiatives of international taxation, notably the financial transaction tax, move beyond the stage of receiving support in official communiqués and are implemented at least in Europe.
The second and larger camp of critics focuses on the quality and effectiveness of aid.
For them there is not much progress since Monterrey either. Donors persistently stress the crucial role of good governance in general, and better control of corruption in particular, for rendering aid more effective. All the same, this rhetoric rings hollow as long as the correlation between corruption and aid remains weak and merit does not appear to shape the allocation of aid. More specifically, the concentration of aid for trade on middle-income countries is in conflict with a needs-based allocation. Finally, the gap between words and deeds continues to be wide when it comes to improving the effectiveness of aid through less proliferation and better coordination among donors. Note: definition of country groups as in the source.
Source: UNCTAD (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/).
